Illustrated by Nick Anderson. Based on research by Jefferson Duarte.  

To learn more, please see: Duarte, J., Siegel, S., & Young, L. (2012). Trust and credit: The role of appearance in peer-to-peer lending. Review of Financial Studies, 25, 2455-2484.

To learn more, please read: Trust Me On This 

Jefferson Duarte is an associate professor of finance the Gerald D. Hines Professor of Real Estate Finance at the Jones Graduate School of Business at Rice University.

Nick Anderson is a Pultizer Prize-winning editorial cartoonist.

Based on research by Brian Akins

• When Credit Rating Agencies have access to better financial reporting, there’s greater agreement among agencies and less credit risk uncertainty.
• After the 1997 implementation of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards, firms that were most affected by the standards had less credit risk uncertainty.
• While higher quality financial reporting lowers risk uncertainty for all credit reporting agencies, it’s especially important for agencies that rely heavily on publicly available reports.

Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) help make the economy go ‘round. That’s why investors rely so heavily on CRAs such as Moody’s Investor Service (Moody’s) and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) to let them know how likely their “bet” is to pay them back in a timely fashion — or ever.

So imagine that you’re thinking of investing in a company with a strong credit rating from a top CRA. As you conduct your due diligence, you discover that yet another top CRA has assigned the very same firm a significantly lower credit rating, indicating that it’s more likely to default on its loans.

Not surprisingly, this disagreement between the CRAs introduces a greater uncertainty of risk, which could influence your investment decision. You might decide you need a higher yield, or request any number of other measures to protect yourself from the perceived risk.

Fortunately for would-be investors, Rice Business professor Brian Akins set out to find out what can be done to increase the harmony between CRA ratings. In particular, he wanted to know if improving the financial reporting that CRAs use would lower the risk uncertainty that ensues when they disagree.

To find out, Akins studied data from three major CRAs: Moody’s and S&P — both of which have access to not just public reports but also corporations’ private information — and Egan-Jones Rating Company (EJR), which relies mainly on public reports.

Akins began by trying to see if reporting quality affected disagreement between Moody’s and S&P, since they have access to similar data. As an indicator of reporting quality, Akins used a measure called “debt contracting value of accounting” (DCV), which shows how well a firm’s earnings information predicts a possible rating change. He calculated the DCV for 1,959 bonds representing 875 firms that were rated by both S&P and Moody’s between 1985 and 2008.

Next, Akins looked at the default risk that S&P and Moody’s assigned to each of these 1,959 bonds. He found that on average, the higher the DCV — that is, the higher the reporting quality — the more likely the agencies were to agree in their ratings. In other words, better reporting quality was indeed linked to less risk uncertainty.

But what about firms such as EJR, which doesn’t have the luxury of accessing a corporation’s privately available information?

Akins found that for EJR, better reporting quality was even more important. That’s because nearly all of the data the firm uses come from the “publicly available” bucket, so the better the quality of this data, the more aligned its ratings will be with other agencies.

Akins wanted to be sure that reporting quality, and nothing else, was indeed the key variable at play, so he analyzed the level of disagreement among credit ratings before and after a mandatory change was made to accounting standards in 1997. This change, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 131, is recognized as having improved reporting quality.

What Akins found is that after SFAS 131 was put into effect, the firms most impacted by the standards had far less disagreement on their credit ratings than similar firms less affected by SFAS 131. Consistent with Akins’ earlier findings, better reporting quality meant more consistent ratings.

In short, when CRAs analyze firms that have higher quality reporting to determine their ratings, they’re more likely to agree on those ratings. This, in turn, means less risk uncertainty for investors, who can be more decisive. Because when it comes to investing money, no one likes surprises.

Brian Akins is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at Jones Graduate School of Business at Rice University.

To learn more, please see: Akins, B. (2018). Financial reporting quality and uncertainty about credit risk among the credit ratings agencies. The Accounting Review, 93(4), 1-22.

In recent months, dozens of Catholic bishops have decided to take action by releasing lists of the priests in their dioceses who were credibly accused of child abuse. Releasing the names is a small step in the right direction, in particular relating to healing relations with parishioners, according to a reputation management expert at Rice University’s Jones Graduate School of Business.

Anastasiya (Annie) Zavyalova, assistant professor of strategic management at Rice Business, is available to discuss Catholic dioceses’ crisis and reputation management with the media.

Zavyalova’s recent research includes an in-progress study of how parishioners reacted to the names of priests released by the Archdiocese of Philadelphia in 2005.

“Organizational consequences of scandals may be shaped by which units within the organization employed the transgressors, the geographic proximity of a focal unit to those associated units, and whether members engage with the organization through ceremonies or rituals,” said Zavyalova, whose general research focuses on negative events in organizations and the role of the media and organizational identification for stakeholder support following such incidents.

To schedule an interview with Zavyalova, contact Jeff Falk, associate director of national media relations at Rice, at jfalk@rice.edu or 713-348-6775.

Rice University has a VideoLink ReadyCam TV interview studio. ReadyCam is capable of transmitting broadcast-quality standard-definition and high-definition video directly to all news media organizations around the world 24/7.

Follow the Jones Graduate School of Business on Twitter @Rice_Biz.

Follow Rice News and Media Relations on Twitter @RiceUNews.

Related materials:

Zavyalova bio: http://business.rice.edu/person/anastasiya-zavyalova

Jones Graduate School of Business: http://business.rice.edu

Based on research by Hajo Adam (former Rice Business professor) and Jeanne M. Brett

• Getting mad to get your way only works in limited contexts.
• In balanced situations, such as sales negotiations, acting out angrily can lead to big concessions.
• In more competitive or cooperative situations, however, showing anger can destroy the negotiation altogether.

You desperately want to make a deal. Will it help you to bellow like an angry elephant? Scientists used to think the answer was yes. Displaying anger, they believed, could gain concessions in making a deal. Recent research into negotiations, however, shows that angry outbursts are more likely to shut the deal-making process down — and even prompt retribution.  

In a paper, former Rice Business professor Hajo Adam partnered with Jeanne M. Brett from the Kellogg School of Management to show that anger can provide a tactical advantage, but only in specific contexts.

According to past research, in negotiations — when a participant aims for any advantage over the opponent — displaying anger sometimes led to better outcomes. Adam’s new experiments demonstrate that, more often than not, the opposite is true. When a negotiation is highly charged and fiercely competitive, angry outbursts are more likely to spark so much hostility that the infuriated counterpart may actually seek revenge. In these cases, sharp words, rising voices and insults actually reduce the chances of getting to yes.

Adam’s findings align with research on the psychological idea of “competitive arousal.” In highly competitive situations, according to this concept, strategic considerations fade in the heat of strong negative emotional reactions, igniting the need to win at all costs. A study of mediated disputes on eBay, for instance, revealed that negotiators who got angry merely elicited anger from other bidders, reducing the odds of a settlement.  

Anger also proved ineffective in cooperative negotiations, when participants negotiate amicably and try to build value together. Take, for example, a disagreement between partners starting a business. In a two-person, virtual teamwork environment, researchers found, subjects who blew their stacks increased interpersonal aggression and drove team performance downward. Subjects who maintained a steely composure were more likely to get a successful outcome.

To test when angry outbursts did and didn’t work, Adam and Brett looked at a mix of negotiating scenarios via computer-mediated experiments.

In one experiment, subjects had $12,000 to hire an IT company to update a website to the latest technical standards. But the best service provider’s bid was $15,000. Participants had to negotiate for a lower price with a counterpart who was either angry or emotionally neutral.

A third of the participants were told that the negotiation should be approached in a competitive spirit; another third were told that it should be approached in a cooperative spirit and the last third were not given any advice. The results offered initial evidence that expressing anger was less effective at scoring concessions in competitive and cooperative negotiations, compared to negotiations where the two factors were balanced.

In a second experiment, Adam and Brett asked 198 participants to negotiate a situation between a chef and an entrepreneur. Again, the negotiation was framed as either competitive, cooperative or balanced. In the competitive situation, the chef and entrepreneur were trying to settle a dispute; in the cooperative condition, they were trying to start a catering business together; in the balanced condition, the chef was attempting to sell the catering business to the entrepreneur.

Once again, getting angry elicited larger concessions in a balanced negotiation context, but backfired in cooperative and competitive contexts. Taken together, these studies suggest that fiery negotiation styles only work in limited circumstances.

But the flames of anger aren’t easy to modulate in the heat of the moment. Instead of assuming that angry outbursts are a viable tactic and then trying to identify the moments when they won’t work, Adam suggested, it probably makes more sense to assume anger isn’t a particularly effective negotiation tactic — and then identify the rare situations when it may work.

In part, this is because it can be so hard to judge how a negotiating partner views the interaction. A conversation that one negotiator may see as clearly cooperative, competitive, or balanced may be characterized entirely differently by the person on the other side of the table. As in the Indian parable of the blind men touching an elephant, everyone comes with their own emotional history, temperament and background, which all but guarantees they will each perceive a different animal. The only certainty, Adam said, is that it’s likely a mistake to poke it with a pointy stick.

Hajo Adam is a former assistant professor of management at Jones Graduate School of Business at Rice University.

To learn more, see Adam, Hajo and Brett, Jeanne M. (2016). Context matters: The social effects of anger in cooperative, balanced, and competitive negotiation situations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 61, 44-58.