# Stefan Huber

sjhuber@rice.edu • www.sjhuber.de

## Research Interests

Banking, Regulation, Disclosure, Structural Estimation

## Academic Positions

**Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University** **Houston, TX**
*Assistant Professor of Accounting* *7/2021 – present*

## Education

**Stanford Graduate School of Business** **Stanford**
*Ph.D. in Business Administration* *2016 – 2021*
*Committee:* Anne Beyer (Chair), Mary Barth, Peter Reiss

**Ludwig-Maximilians Universität** **Munich**
*Master of Business Research* *2013 – 2016*

**Ludwig-Maximilians Universität** **Munich**
*B.Sc. in Business Administration* *2010 – 2013*
Graduated top of class

## Working Papers

**Loan loss measurement and bank lending**
*Job Market Paper*

**Abstract:**
I use both theoretical and empirical models to assess how alternative measurement approaches to banks' loan loss allowances affect lending when banks are subject to regulatory capital requirements. I find that: (1) the Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) method increases loan loss reserves on average by 16% relative to the Incurred Credit Loss (ICL) method; (2) the difference between CECL loan loss allowances and ICL loan loss allowances is larger in economic downturns than upswings; (3) banks reduce lending on average by 3.15% (50 basis points) when switching from ICL to CECL; and (4) CECL results in less procyclical lending than ICL, specifically, the difference between lending in up- vs. downturns decreases by 0.8% (37 basis points) when moving from ICL to CECL.

**The signaling value of accelerated share repurchases**
*Abstract below*

## Work in progress

**Soft Dollars for soft information: A structural approach**
*Abstract below, modeling complete, data work in-progress*

**Do you bank with conscience? ESG Ratings and Bank Deposits? (with Rebecca Zhang)**
*Abstract below, preliminary results*

## Conference Participation

**2020**: AAA/J. Michael Cook/Deloitte Foundation Doctoral Consortium
**2019**: UNC Tax Doctoral Seminar
**2018**: Accounting Theory Conference at The University of Texas at Austin
**2015**: ATA Midyear Meeting, EAA Annual Congress, WU Vienna Doctoral Conference

## Teaching Experience

**ACCT 219: MSx: Accounting** **Stanford GSB**
*Teaching assistant for Prof. Anne Beyer* *Summer 2018, Summer 2019*

**ACCT 210: Financial Accounting** **Stanford GSB**
*Teaching assistant for Prof. Rebecca Lester* *Fall 2017*

**Empirical Research in Tax Accounting** **Ludwig-Maximilians Universität Munich**
*Main lecturer, M.Sc. Seminar* *Fall 2016 – 2020*

## Professional Experience

**Ludwig-Maximilians Universität, Institute for Business Taxation** **Munich**
*Full-time research assistant for Prof. Deborah Schanz* *2014 – 2016*

**PriceWaterhouseCoopers** **Munich**
*Audit intern* *2012*

## Awards & Honors

**Stanford Graduate School of Business Fellowship** *2016 – 2021*

**Max-Weber Program Scholarship** German National Academic Foundation *2010 – 2015*

**Ottmar-Bühler Förderpreis** *2014*

**Oliver Wyman Award** *2013*

## Service

**Ad-hoc Referee**: Review of Accounting Studies

**Stanford GSB Ph.D. Association**: Treasurer *2017 – 2019*

**Stanford Graduate Life Office**: Community Associate *2019 – 2021*

## Skills

**Programming**: R, Julia, Mathematica, Python, Matlab, Stata, SQL

**Languages**: German (native), English (fluent), French (Level C1, good), Turkish (basic)

## Other Interests

Swimming, Skiing, Baking, Hops harvesting

## References

**Anne Beyer (Chair)**
*Associate Professor of Accounting*
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Email: abeyer@stanford.edu
Phone: +1 (650) 723-0605

**Mary E. Barth**
*Joan E. Horngren Professor of Accounting, Emerita*
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Email: mbarth@stanford.edu
Phone: +1 (650) 723-8536

**Peter C. Reiss**
*MBA Class of 1963 Professor of Economics*
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Email: preiss@stanford.edu
Phone: +1 (650) 725-2759

# Abstracts

## The signaling value of accelerated share repurchases

Although Accelerated Share Repurchase (ASR) programs have a built-in commitment mechanism that Open Market (OMR) programs are lacking, prior research has not found evidence of announcement returns to differ significantly between ASR and OMR programs (Farre-Mensa et al., 2014). In this paper, I provide a theoretical explanation for this empirical puzzle by endogenizing firms' choice of repurchase method. The model predicts that a separating equilibrium and, thus, differing announcement returns, exist only if firms' orientation is sufficiently long-term and liquidity is sufficiently low. When incorporating firms' long-term orientation and market liquidity as moderating variables into the statistical analysis, I find evidence that is broadly consistent with the model predictions.

## Do you bank with conscience? ESG Ratings and Bank Deposits? (with Rebecca Zhang)

This paper studies whether investors' non-pecuniary preferences, such as preferences for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues affect the demand for financial assets? To isolate investors' preferences over ESG from the signaling value of ESG about future financial performance of an asset, this paper studies this question in the context of insured bank deposits. Deposit insurance renders expectations about banks' future financial condition orthogonal to the deposit decision. We find that insured deposit levels and flows are positively associated with higher ESG ratings of a bank. Specifically, a 1% increase in average ESG rating corresponds to a 10% increase in average deposit growth. This finding yields new insights into the market for insured deposits that accounts for more than 42% of banks' funding and shows that, contrary to widely held beliefs, interest rate-based competition among banks is not the sole determinant of outcomes in this market.

## Soft Dollars for soft information: A structural approach

RegFD prohibits the selective disclosure of material information to reduce information asymmetry among market participants and increases liquidity. However, investor conferences and private meetings with management have become an important communication tool in the post-RegFD economy providing potential avenues for selective disclosure. In this paper, I theoretically model and empirically estimate selective communication among managers and investors in the U.S. equity market. I show that a firm optimally chooses a communication strategy that selectively reveals information only to a subset of the market in order to increase its analyst following. Selective disclosure increases disagreement among traders and raises expected trading volume which attracts more analysts to follow the stock. Using data on analyst following and brokerage-specific trading volume from 2015 – 2020, I estimate the model and quantify the amount of selectively disclosed information in the capital market.